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avalanche at Leuwigajah dumpsite, Bandung,
Indonesia
Franck Lavigne1*, Patrick Wassmer2,3, Christopher Gomez3, Thimoty A Davies4, Danang Sri Hadmoko5,
T Yan W M Iskandarsyah2, JC Gaillard6, Monique Fort7, Pauline Texier8, Mathias Boun Heng1
and Indyo Pratomo9Abstract
Background: On 21 February 2005 the Leuwigajah dumpsite, Bandung (Java, Indonesia) was affected by a large
slide after heavy rainfalls. Second deadliest waste slide in history, it buried 71 houses and killed 143 people.
Amongst the contemporary disastrous events of this type, only a few have been documented. We explored failure
preconditions, triggering mechanisms and local context that conducted to this disaster. We carried on four field
investigations on the site. A series of aerial photographs were acquired and completed by topographical measures
on the ground. The morphology of the slide and its trajectory were reconstructed. To constrain the movement
condition, we studied the internal structure of the source area and realized surveys among stakeholders of the
dumpsite and citizen.
Results: 2.7 ? 10 6 m3 of waste materials spread 1000 m from the source in a rice field with an average thickness of
10 m. The material displays a preferential fabric parallel to the previous topography. Numerous internal slip surfaces,
underlined by plastic bags explain the low friction coefficient. The presence of methane within the waste dump
was responsible for explosions prior to sliding and for the fire that affects whole sliding mass.
Conclusions: Resulting of a combination of heavy rainfall and consecutive explosions due to biogas sudden
release, this disaster was predictable in reason of
i) a front slope of the dump of about 100% before the failure;
ii) a poor dumpsite management;
iii) the extreme vulnerability of the marginalized scavengers living at risk at the foot of the instable dump.
Keywords: Dump-slide; Waste instabilitytriggering factors; Waste management; Precondition factors; Bandung; IndonesiaBackground
A landfill site or dumpsite is a site for the disposal of waste
materials by burial. Although progressively replaced by
alternative methods like incineration, this technique
remains very common around the world, especially in
developing countries. Stability of landfills is one of the
major geotechnical issues in landfill management. Despite* Correspondence: franck.lavigne@univ-paris1.fr
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Sorbonne University, Meudon, France
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Attribution License (http://creativecommons.or
in any medium, provided the original work is pa wide range of industrial hazardous accidents that have
occurred worldwide in and around the vicinity of dump-
sites, only a handful of contemporary disastrous solid
? wasteslides? or ? waste avalanches? have been docu-
mented. Such events have occurred in western post-
industrial countries (e.g. in Kettleman, California, in 1988,
Cincinnati, Ohio and Coru?a, Spain in 1996, or Athens
in 2003), but it is only in developing countries that they
have led to major disasters: the deadliest event of this
type killed 278 people in Payatas in the vicinity of
Manila, Philippines in 2000 (Bernardo 2004; Merry et al.n Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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2009). Among these disasters, the second deadliest
event in history took place on 21 February 2005 at
02.00 am at the Leuwigajah dumpsite, in the vicinity
of Bandung city, Java, Indonesia (Figure 1). The waste
slide buried 71 houses and killed 143 people.
For landslide analysis, precondition factors are gen-
erally related to slope, lithology, geological structure,
and soil. In a municipal dumpsite, the conditions that
govern the landfill stability are more difficult to assess.
Shear strength of the municipal solid waste is a func-
tion of many factors such as waste type, composition,
compaction, daily cover, moisture conditions, age, de-
composition, overburden pressure, etc. (Huvaj-Sarihan,
and Stark 2008; Stark et al. 2000; Bray et al. 2009). In
addition, the triggering factors of waste slides are
more complex than for landslide initiation, due to fre-
quent explosions in the dumpsites. The motion pro-
cesses of the waste avalanches are also complex and
poorly known.
Focusing on the 2005 Leuwigajah disaster, the present
contribution aims to present: (1) the factors of the fail-
ure; (2) the reconstruction of the motion mechanism of
the waste slide; (3) the identification of the underlying
causes of the disaster.Figure 1 Location of the 21 February 2005 waste avalanche at Leuwi
3 August 2006 (source: GoogleEarth).Waste management operation activities in the
Leuwigajah dumpsite
The total amount of waste generation in Indonesia is es-
timated at about 39 million t/year (Yachiyo Engineering
Co. 2009). To better understand the context of waste
management of large cities in Java Island, the Figure 1
illustrates the waste management operation activities in
Jakarta (Texier 2009; Pasang et al. 2007). Before reaching
the final disposal site (TPA), the garbage is the object of
a series of transitional processes (Figure 2). Solid waste
management strongly depends on the availability of land
to be used as TPA.
For decades, several dumpsites have operated in
Bandung Metropolitan area, which has approximately 6
million inhabitants. In 2005, solid waste generation in
this region exceeded 14,000 m3 per day (Sundana 2005),
of which more than half was generated within Bandung
city. Household activities produced the highest volume
of waste (7700 m3 per day), followed by industrial waste
(3200 m3 per day) and public facilities (1400 m3 per
day). Out of the whole volume of waste produced in the
metropolitan area, only 46% was collected (Sundana
2005). Most of the uncollected waste was dumped in the
rivers (mainly the Citarum River), burned by the popula-
tion or buried in the backyard.gajah, Bandung, in Java Island. High-resolution satellite image as of
Figure 2 Waste management operation activities in Jakarta (source: Texier, 2009, modified).
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chose the small valley-head of Leuwigajah, a neighborhood
of Cimahi, to locate the largest waste disposal for the
urban centre. The geological setting consists of volcanic
rock (mainly andesite) covered by a thin layer (1 m) of silt
or clay material. Before the dumpsite was set up in 1987,
small water streams ran through the small valley, mainly
during the wet season from October to April. The dump-
site was operated by three different authorities: the City of
Bandung, the District of Bandung, and the City of Cimahi.
More than 4500 t (or 750 m3) municipal solid waste per
day were delivered daily to this dumpsite before the disas-
ter occurred. About 50% of the inhabitants of the two vil-
lages located downslope (Leuwigajah and Batujajar) were
working on the dump. With a metal hook in one hand
and a plastic bag in the other, they methodically rum-
maged for reusable waste on the deposit from morning to
evening. It is within this context of ill-management that
the 21 February 2005 part of the mount created by the
garbage slid down.Methods
A few months after the disaster, our international team
carried out a first field survey, which was followed by
three field surveys between 2005 and 2007. The field
surveys have combined a variety of geological and geo-
graphical techniques. At the deposit scale, a series of
aerial photographs acquired by Ultra-Light Motorized
(ULM) three days after the disaster by the Department
of Engineering Geology of the Institute of Technology
of Bandung (ITB) provided data of the length, width,
and surface of the waste slide deposit. At a meter to
sub-meter scale, we completed the 2D planar data with
vertical measures - like the height of the scarp - that we
measured using a handheld laser range finder (LaserAce
300). Using a compass, we defined the orientations of
the sliding surfaces of the plastic waste and the orienta-
tions of the deposits. The compilation of the orientation
data, revealed the direction of the waste during motion.
Based on this dataset, we used traditional methods of
landslide deposits, in order to understand the complex
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in the medial part of the deposit where the material had
not been disturbed after the event, i.e. upstream from the
location of the buried villages. However, heterogeneous
waste composition (Figure 3), obstacles in determining
waste strength parameters, and a lack of knowledge about
the principles of waste mechanics result in considerable
uncertainties in stability calculations. Therefore such
calculations were not considered in this study.
Interviews were aimed at obtaining a better under-
standing of the dumpsite management and the disaster ? s
phenomenology. Key respondents included the chief of
the Directorate of Volcanology and Geological Hazards
Mitigation, the dumpsite security guard, the staff of the
administration in charge of the landfill management,
and others. Other interviews were conducted with eye-
witnesses of the event, including scavengers and inhabi-
tants of the buried villages. Collected data included
information about the number of explosions, the direc-
tion of the surges, and the timing of the waste avalanche.
In addition to the field investigations, additional second-
ary data were compiled from different sources on waste
cohesion and internal friction angle of the deposit
(Koelsch et al. 2005), and gas content within the landfill
(P.T. Perusahaan Gas Negara and Perusahaan Daerah
Kebersihan Kota Bandung 2000).
Results
Analysis of waste deposits: a key to reconstruct the waste
avalanche dynamics
Morphometry of the waste deposits
Five months after the February 2005 disaster, the up-
stream part of the dumpsite displays a 10 m-high scarp
cutting the waste accumulation (Figure 4). At the base
of the scarp, the waste deposits are very thin or absent
because they have been washed away during the 2005Figure 3 Sampling of the waste deposits (photo: F. Lavigne,
February 2007).event. The Figure 4 clearly shows that the gradient of
the natural slope was very high, in the order of 45?.
The whole mass of waste spread 1000 m from the
source and covered a 180? 340 m wide strip in the rice
fields (Figure 5), with an average thickness of about 10 m,
although the thickness varied greatly. The overall volume
of the displaced waste was initially estimated at 1 ? 10 6 m3
(Sub-Direktorat Mitigasi Bencana Geologi 2005), before
being reviewed from 2.7 ? 10 6 m3 (Koelsch et al. 2005) to
3.5 ? 10 6 m3 (Yachiyo Engineering Co. 2009). The morph-
ology of the deposit is similar to an alluvial fan, but with
margins characterized by steep slopes with lateral ridges.
Structure and composition of the waste deposits
The deposit ? s structure displays different waste layers,
which correspond to independent units. Washed by the
rain, plastic bags constitute the main part of the material
within the upper layers of the dump mass. Most of this
material was found burnt due to the gas release, as were
the bodies of the victims.
Below the surface, the layers comprise plastic bags
remnants mixed with soil and a fine-grained matrix of
decomposed organic garbage. Other materials found
within the deposits were plastic pieces, stones, pieces of
wood, metallic material etc. The main part of the deposit
displays a finely foliated structure generally underlain by
remainders of plastic bags. All the material shows a pref-
erential fabric rather parallel to the previous topography.
Outcrops conform to the displacement direction are
showing undulating discontinuities that delimit 5 to
30 cm thick stratified layers (Figure 6).
Reconstruction of the waste avalanche dynamics
The independent layers of the waste deposit suggest that
during the motion, basal layers stopped while upper
layers were still moving, so the stationary base rose in-
crementally, increasing the deposit volume. The undulat-
ing discontinuities seem to correspond to friction
surfaces between the layers. The morphology of the de-
posit, similar to an alluvial fan with steep slopes margins,
also suggests that the movement could have been a flow.
Therefore it is assumed that the movement can be lik-
ened to a debris avalanche, beginning by sliding then
evolving to a flow. It seems that the movement was
rapid; people had no time to escape although shelter was
only 100 m away. Most of the victims were found in
groups inside their houses.
In order to compare motion characteristics of the
waste avalanche to the one of the debris avalanches, the
effective friction angle of the material can be estimated.
As the distance from the source to the rice fields is
1000 m and the difference of elevation between the scar
and the distal part of the deposit is ~100 m, the H/L
ratio is 0.1. This low coefficient indicates an efficient
Figure 4 Scarp of the dumpsite after the February 2005 disaster. In the foreground, a scavenger carrying reusable material from the
dumpsite. In the background, the steep natural slope in brown color (photo: F. Lavigne, July 2005).
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ing mass. In the case of the Leuwigajah waste avalanche,
it is assumed that the high content of plastic bags was
responsible for the internal friction reduction as men-
tioned above.
Origins of the waste slide
Precondition factors of the failure
The procedure for waste disposal was initially regulated
(control landfill), however it progressively evolved to an
uncontrolled open dump without any regulation (P.T.
Perusahaan Gas Negara and Perusahaan Daerah Kebersihan
Kota Bandung 2000).
The great heterogeneity of the waste material, mainly
comprising a mixture of plastic bags, pieces of clothes,
metallic debris, wood, fine-grained material of organic
origin etc. make it difficult to sample the undisturbed
material (Figure 3). Therefore, we did not calculate the
key parameters for slope stability analysis such as cohe-
sion or internal friction angle.
In the months preceding the 2005 disaster, fires have
been reported at the Leuwigajah dump site. Eyewitnesses
reported that the waste mass was on fire while moving.
Fires may have spread quickly because the landfill con-
tained highly flammable combustible material. All the
bodies of the victims were burnt, and the studied mater-
ial was rather deeply charred. Where fires burn quan-
tities of flammable organic materials, such as plastics,
temperatures may be very high in the burning zone. This
can then ignite methane in the presence of the oxygen
(Woodward 1997). Deep-seated fires are found at depth
in material deposited weeks, months, or years earlier.The common cause of deep-seated fires is an increase in
the oxygen level within the landfill, which increases aer-
obic bacterial activity causing a temperature rise. Deep-
seated fires have the potential to: (i) create large voids,
invisible from the surface, which can cause cracking
and subsidence of the landfill surface; and (ii) produce
flammable and toxic gasses, e.g. carbon monoxide, a
toxic gas extremely flammable. It is flammable when
mixed with air at concentrations between 12% and 75%
(Woodward 1997).
An additional factor contributing to the waste slide
was the natural instability of the hillslope at the dump-
site. Geologically, the bedrock of the dumpsite is welded
volcanic materials (i.e. andesitic volcanic breccia and
grain-supported breccia) covered by a thin layer of silt
or clay soil. These parent slope materials have a rela-
tively low permeability. Therefore they prevented drain-
age and acted as a slip surface for the overlying waste
materials that were saturated by infiltrating rainwater.
After the 21 February 2005 event, small shallow land-
slides were identified in the weathered pyroclastic material
along the scarp. These landslides were probably triggered
by the release of the pressure applied by the dump mater-
ial on the valley walls in the immediate aftermath of the
event.
Triggering factors of the failure
The analysis of the deposit and the interviews have lead
to the identification of two direct triggering factors for
the waste slide initiation:
(1) Explosion due to sudden biogas release has been
identified as the main factor that has triggered the waste
Figure 5 Deposits of the 21 May 2005 waste avalanche at Leuwigajah. (a) Aerial view on 3 August 2006 (source: GoogleEarth).
(b) Longitudinal profile. Dotted area: regolith and soil; (c) Picture of solid waste deposits overlapping rice fields. Notice the smoke emissions
attesting permanent deep combustion (photo: F. Lavigne, 22 July 2005).
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three almost simultaneous explosion-like sounds a few
minutes before the slide. They all insisted that the sound
was muffled and seemed to come from deep in the
ground. A survey in February 2000 in the Leuwigajah
dumpsite indicated a CH4 content of 2.3% per volume of
gas at a 2 m depth, and almost 5% at a 4 m depth (P.T.
Perusahaan Gas Negara and Perusahaan Daerah Kebersihan
Kota Bandung 2000). It can be assumed that the CH4 con-
centration would have been higher than these values at
higher depths. Yet explosion in a dump site may occur ifthe proportion of CH4 in the air ranges from 5% to 15%
(Esmaili 1975). Above 15%, the biogas ignites but doesn? t
explode. The explosion hazard was therefore implicit a
few years before the 2005 disaster.
The explosions may have resulted from three factors re-
lated to the deep-seated fires described above (see 4.2.1).:
(i) build-up of landfill gas in enclosed spaces, (ii) ignition
of flammable (e.g. plastic bags) or explosive material de-
posited in the landfill, and (iii) bursting of sealed drums,
cans, aerosol containers or gas bottles deposited in the
landfill.
Figure 6 Internal structure of the deposit showing undulating
discontinuities and foliated layers (photo: P. Wassmer, February
2007).
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turbance (quick increase in shear stress or decrease in
shear strength) of the saturated waste material. This sce-
nario is also supported by pieces of plastic bags still in
place along the post-disaster scarp of the dump (Figure 7)
displaying some horizontal orientations (mostly from
N196? to N238?), i.e. parallel to the contour line.
(2) The second triggering factor is meteorological.
Three days of heavy rainfall (over 80 mm per day) prior
to the failure increased the weight of the waste and the
pore-water pressure in the soft subsoil. Water was re-
ported seeping from under the dump three hours before
the slide, seeming to indicate that at that time the de-
posit was saturated. Hence a sudden rise of pressure
could be at the origin of both the muffled noise and
destabilization of the dump mass. However, it remains
unclear whether the explosion led to the slope failure orFigure 7 Pieces of plastic bags displaying horizontal orientations
along the post-disaster scarp of the dump (Photo: F. Lavigne,
July 2005).if the failure, allowing oxygen to reach the combustion
zone, triggered the explosion.
Discussion
An unusual combination of triggering processes
The triggering mechanisms of the waste collapse com-
bined water saturation of the waste deposit, water
vaporization, and explosion although these triggers are
usually distinct. Thus most of the failures in dump sites
relates to heavy rainfall, e.g. the 10 July 2000 disaster at
Payatas, the largest dumpsite of Manila city, which oc-
curred following the occurrence of two typhoons. How-
ever, waste slides may be also generated without rain, by,
either increasing of pore water pressure due to leachate
circulation, e.g. during the 8 September 2006 waste slide
at the Bantar Gebang dumpsite (Bekasi, Jakarta), or by
explosion, e.g. in 1993 at Gembloux, Belgium, or in 1995
at Skellingsted, Denmark (Kjeldsen and Fisher 1995).
Difficulties and attempts to assess dump instability
Whatever the triggering processes, disasters related to
waste avalanche always occur in critical or unstable
dumpsites. However, geotechnical data are usually poorly
documented due to the difficulty of sampling undis-
turbed waste deposits (Figure 3), which are typically het-
erogeneous and very fibrous (Stark et al. 2000). Besides,
the properties of the waste fill layer are difficult to meas-
ure by laboratory or field tests due to their heterogen-
eity. In addition, the physical and chemical properties of
the deposits rapidly evolve over time due to the change
of waste thickness and to the progressive waste decom-
position (Blight and Fourie 2005). Lastly, the pore water
pressure also varies over time within the waste deposits,
as shown at the Do?a Juana dumpsite in Bogota by
Caicedo et al. (2002). Nevertheless, stability calculations
have been carried out. The main parameters influencing
the factor of safety were calculated using conventional
methods used in soil mechanics: at Payatas and Do?a
Juana dumpsites (Table 1), cohesion values (C) of about
2 tons/m2 were obtained, and the internal friction angle
(φ) ranged from 23 to 28? (Merry et al. 2005, GeoSyntec
Consultants 1998). However, the geotechnical character-
istics of waste deposits led other researchers to use more
specific methods, more adapted to stability calculation
on landfills. For example, the calculation method used
by Koelsch (1996) considers the reinforcement effect,
which is generated by tensile forces in fibres and foils.
The mobilization of tensile forces depends on the nor-
mal stress on the fibres. Tensile stress and normal stress
are related by a linear function, which is mathematically
described by the internal angle of tensile stress ζ. The
component of shear strength which is created by tensile
forces is called fibrous cohesion (Bray et al. 2009). The
fibrous cohesion is calculated from the internal angle of
Table 1 Documented wasteslide events in municipal solid waste dumpsites
Location Year Fatalities Reference
Payatas, Manila, Philippines 2000 278 Bernardo (2004); Merry et al. (2005); Palaypayon and Ohta (2006); Gaillard and Cadag (2009)
Leuwigajah, Bandung, Indonesia 2005 147 This work; Koelsch et al. (2005)
Belo Horizonte, Brazil 1992 > 100 http://www.humanite.presse.fr/journal/1992-03-20/1992-03-20-650098
Istanbul, Turkey 1993 39 Kocasoy and Curi (1995); Koerner and Soong (2000); Huvaj-Sarihan and Stark (2008)
Bantargebang, Bekasi,
West Java, Indonesia
2006 28 Suara Merdeka, 9 September 2006; personal field data
Bogor, West Java, Indonesia 2010 4 http://www.jakartaupdates.com/74-municipal-waste-landfill-colapsed-killing-4
Cianjur, West Java, Indonesia 2013 1 http://nasional.news.viva.co.id/news/read/383558-bukit-sampah-longsor ? lima-orang-tertimbun
Tuban, East Java, Indonesia 2012 1 http://news.detik.com/read/2012/06/22/190405/1948742/475/pencarian-korban-longsor-sampah-
pt-sg-di-tuban-dihentikan
Bantargebang, Bekasi,
West Java, Indonesia
2012 1 http://www.beritasatu.com/megapolitan/48700-sampah-bantargebang-longsor-seorangpemulung-
tewas-tertimbun.html
Athens, Greece 2003 - Cited by Koelsch et al. (2005)
Bulbul, Durban, South Africa 1997 Blight (2004, 2008)
Iriya, Tel-Aviv, Israel 1997 - Isenberg (2003); Isenberg et al. (2004); Huvaj-Sarihan and Stark (2008)
Do?a Juana, Bogota, Colombia 1997 - GeoSyntec Consultants ( 1998); Hendron et al. (1999); Caicedo et al. (2002) ; Gonzales Garcia and
Espinosa Silva (2001)
Bens, Coru?a, Spain 1996 - Landva and Dickinson ( 2000)
Rumpke, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA 1996 - Eid et al. (2000); Chugh et al. (2007); Evans & Stark (1997); Schmucker and Hendron (1998)
Leuwigajah, Bandung, Indonesia 1992 - Personal field data
Kettleman, California, USA 1988 - Mitchell et al. (1990); Seed et al. (1990); Byrne et al. (1992); Chang (2005)
Sarajevo, Bosnia 1977 - Gandolla et al. (1979)
Bandeirantes, Sa? Paulo, Brazil 1991 - Bauer et al. ( 2008)
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and a function considering the anisotropy (direction be-
tween the fibres and the shear plane). This method was
used at Leuwigajah for a stability calculation conducted
by Koelsch et al. (2005). A situation has been modeled
without landfill fire. The overall stability amounted to
η = 1.13. A second modeling showed that the rein-
forcement particles in the upper part of the landfill
were destroyed due to a smouldering landfill fire which
burned over one month combusting waste particles like
plastic fibres and foils. It was assumed that all tensile
strength has been lost. Overall stability reduced from
1.13 to 1.00. Therefore the dumpsite became unstable.
Provided a proper construction and an appropriate op-
eration, the landfill would not have faced any stability
problems. According to Koelsch and Ziehmann (2004),
landfill operators should follow two basic rules: to pro-
tect holding forces, and to reduce driving forces. Sug-
gested operating measures are: (1) good compaction to
reduce water percolation; (2) homogeneous permeabil-
ity and efficient drainage system to prevent improper
water balance; (3) forecast of the changes in waste
composition and condition; and (4) measures to im-
prove waste strength properties (e.g. use of combined
liner system of mineral-synthetics). Unfortunately, solidwaste landfills are still poorly managed in developing
country, e.g. little landfill gas management, or often in-
adequate leachate management measures (Johannessen
and Boyer G 1999).
A difficulty to assess motion processes of waste
avalanches
The study focused on the motion processes of the waste,
which are poorly known. It can be argued that the upper
part of the waste mass moved downward through a
sliding process, whereas the distal part displayed a flow
motion, similar as a debris avalanche. Surprisingly, this
statement is not consistent with the interpretations of
formers studies (Table 1). Half of the events described in
the literature were clearly defined as slides (e.g. at
Kettleman in California, Istanbul, Coro?a, Jakarta). Other
events were described as waste flows similar to debris
flows (e.g. at Bogota, Durban, Manila and maybe Belo
Horizonte). However, the interpretations of the former
studies were only based on visual observations by eyewit-
nesses, whereas the methods we used combined both
eyewitness accounts and a field analysis of the internal
structure of the waste deposits. This original approach for
this kind of study allows us to state that both sliding and
flow processes were involved during the 2005 waste
Lavigne et al. Geoenvironmental Disasters 2014, 1:10 Page 9 of 12
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may be of different type depending on the internal struc-
ture of the material deposited in the dump and the origin
of motion. Like natural slides, avalanches and debris flows
the intrinsic scale and prior characteristics of the material
involved may very well be the conditioning factor leading
to a certain mechanisms of movement.
The volume of the 2005 collapsed waste (2.7 ? 10 6 m3)
is higher than any of the previous similar events (Table 1):
their volumes did not exceed a few hundreds of thousands
cubic meters at Bogota (1997) or Manila (2000), and
reached 1.3 ? 10 6 m3 at Istanbul (Kocasoy and Curi 1995), −
half the volume of the waste deposits at Leuwigajah. The
large volume of water saturated waste at Leuwigajah, in
addition to the explosion may explain the excessive runout
up to 1000 m. The high content of plastic bags (apparently
more than 10%, which is the highest proportion found in
most of the municipal dumpsites ? see Table 1 in Blight
and Mbande 1998) could have also contributed to this
excessive runup by reducing internal friction.
As mentioned above (see 4.2.1.), all the bodies of the
victims were burnt. This fact, inconsistent with the
heavy rains (see below 4.2.2), must be explained. It is
probable that the high content of plastic bags, that con-
stituted numerous quite impervious surfaces, formed a
high number of parallel slippery surfaces parallel to the
valley slope as attested by outcrops along the scar. This
could have reduced the friction during the transport by
both trapping rising methane emissions, and trapping
the water percolating during heavy rains. Considering
these assumptions together with all the characteristics ofTable 2 Two scenarios for waste avalanche initiation
Scenario 1: failure due to dump mass saturation by rainwater Scena
(1) The infiltration of rainfall decreased the shear strength of the
dump, leading to its slide;
(1) He
the
(2) Once in motion, the disturbance of the mass structure allowed
large volumes of methane to contact smouldering waste, leading
to the explosions.
(2) Th
ins
(3) Th
the
a s
pre
(3) The material experienced a long runout, because of the
intrinsically low internal friction of the saturated waste material,
aided by steam production. The ? still-hot? material would have
then also burnt the victims of the slide.
(1) Th
bri
exp
(2) As
mo
wa
an
(3) Th
ga
thi
exp
of
hig
mathe movement and the data collected on site, the authors
propose two potential scenarios (Table 2).
Uncommon hazard, but predictable disaster
Compared to the previous similar events documented in
the scientific literature, the 2005 event displays some
distinguishing features concerning both the hazard and
the factors of vulnerability on site, which finally led to a
major disaster.
The Leuwigajah disaster was predictable as it repeated
similar events that have happened in other parts of the
world. The waste slide indeed affected marginalized and
vulnerable people who struggled to make a living out of
the dumpsite. Poor people scavenging, sorting and sell-
ing rubbish to more powerful and affluent middlemen is
a common pattern in Bogota, Belo Horizonte, Manila
and Jakarta, and all these areas were affected by waste
slide disasters in the recent decades. Children are the
most vulnerable people facing waste slide hazard. On 16
March 2010, a 6-meter-high and 20-meter-long massive
barrier fell down, killing four scavengers and badly hurting
eight more people at the Galuga Municipal Waste storage
in Cibungbulang, a suburb of Bogor city in Indonesia.
Eleven of twelve victims were only 13 to 20 years old
(Indonesia Today, posted online on 16 March 2010).
The abundant and constant flow of waste constitutes a
significant resource for the poorest suburban communi-
ties. In Leuwigajah the amount of solid waste dumped
was 14.7 ? 10 6 m3 in 1999 (P.T. Perusahaan Gas Negara
and Perusahaan Daerah Kebersihan Kota Bandung
2000). For those who migrate to the vicinities of largerio 2: failure triggered by explosion
avy rainfall on the dump site led to increased water percolation through
waste material.
e percolating water reached the top of the combustion zone deeply
ide the waste mass.
e vaporization of the water produced an increase of gas pressure at
base of the dump that probably lifted up a part of it, resulting in
ound-like explosion during the liberation of the accumulated
ssured gas.
e vaporization and the lift up processes combined their effects to
ng air to the combustion zone. The second and probably the third
losion then occurred.
the destabilized mass began to slide, the fire propagated to the whole
ving mass, helped by the significant amount of CH4 trapped into the
ste material (numerous swirling flames were reported by eyewitnesses
d were probably due to the gas trapped in the plastic bags).
e combustion of each plastic bag within the moving mass produced
s that allow an expansion of the whole mass to occur. Once started,
s mechanism, as well as water vaporization, triggered a self maintaining
ansion during the transport. This self maintaining expansion, responsible
a friction reduction within the waste material, determined the unusually
h mobility of the moving mass and can also explain why the whole
terial was deeply burned.
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draw a living from as scavenging rubbish does not require
specific skills. In the two villages next to Leuwigajah, it
was estimated from interviews with key respondents that
about 50% of the people were largely dependent on
scavenging rubbish for their subsistence.
To these people the dumpsite is both a hazard and a
resource but people brave the potential threat of waste
slides on a seasonal basis to secure their daily needs.
This was very evident in 1992 when a smaller waste slide
occurred in Leuwigajah. Although seven houses were
buried ? fortunately no one died ? people continued to
scavenge rubbish as they did before. Similarly, in Payatas,
Philippines, a waste slide buried several houses in 1999, or
a year before the 2000 tragedy, but none of the affected
families accepted the relocation scheme offered by the
local government (Gaillard and Cadag 2009).
The immediate environment of dumpsites is usually
considered as unsuitable for settlement by those who
can choose where they live. On the other hand, for the
most marginalized and poorest people, the cheap and
often illegal nature of settlements near dumpsite isFigure 8 Post-disaster regreening of the Leuwigajah dump site in 201
(source: GoogleEarth). b. Oblic photograph taken from the scarp to the Sou
on http://www.panoramio.com/photo/33538781).another resource as these people cannot afford more
expensive rents in safe places (Blight and Mbande 1998).
Settling far away from their primary mean of livelihood,
i.e. the dumpsite, would also imply time and financial
costs they cannot support. Interviews conducted after
the Leuwigajah disaster showed that hundreds of fam-
ilies used to live within 500 m from the foot slopes of
the Leuwigajah dumpsite. Most of these people further
lived in houses made of scrap materials scavenged from
the dumpsite. Such housing proved to be very vulnerable
to urban fire and waste slide.
Since to the 2005 disaster, the Leuwigajah dump site
has been abandonned, and progressively recovered by
the natural vegetation (Figure 8), thanks to the high
content of organic material in the waste deposits that
allowed the formation of a soil. Since the 2005 disaster,
the Bandung municipality lacks a suitable site and
finances to construct a new sanitary landfill. Therefore
West Java Province has planned to construct two new
sanitary landfills outside Bandung Municipality at Legok
Nangka (30 ha) and Leuwigajah (40 ha) to be used by
Bandung Municipality. The contract has been signed in0. a. Aerial view of the waste avalanche deposits on 13 June 2010
thwest on 20 March 2010 (Courtesy: admbang setdaprovjabar
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2014. Another project that encompasses the construction
of an incinerator is highly criticized for ecological reasons
(see http://www.sorgemagz.com/?p=3870 in Indonesian).
However, most of the other open dump sites in
Indonesia are still uncontrolled, and therefore constitute
a significant hazard for many communities. For example,
the TPA Putri Cempo was built in 1985 in the vicinity of
Surakarta (Central Java) for a scheduled life time of
15 years. However, this open dump site is still used
today, although it remains unstable due to its overload
and to the steep slope of its 9.5 m high front. Due to a
rapid urban growth, all the large cities of Indonesia are
concerned by the waste slide hazard, as exemplified by
recent disasters or accidents (Table 1), e.g. at Bekasi in
the vicinity of Jakarta in 2006 (28 deaths) and again in
2012, Bogor in 2010 (4 deaths), and Cianjur in 2013
(1 death). The transformation from uncontrolled open
dump to controlled sanitary landfills is therefore highly
recommended.
Conclusion
On the 21 February 2005 at 2.00 am, 143 people and 71
houses were buried under several meters of waste in mo-
tion initiated from the Leuwigajah dump site (Bandung,
Indonesia). This disaster ranges second among the deadli-
est events of this type worldwide., The failure in the dump
resulted from two triggering processes, i.e. heavy rainfall
and consecutive explosions due to biogas sudden release.
The flow initially moved as a slide, and then evolved into a
flow. The waste avalanche extended as far as 1000 m from
the scarp towards the paddy fields, due to the limited
shear stress at the base of and within the waste in motion.
Several factors may have played a key role in the shear
stress reduction, e.g. the high quantity of biogas and water
into the flowing mass, the very low weight of the material
transported by the avalanche (plastic bags), the wet surface
of the paddy field etc.
Whatever the natural triggers for the waste slide, the
disaster cannot be dissociated from the extreme vulner-
ability of those marginalized people who died and suf-
fered. Although previous waste slides occurred in the
past the local government failed to both implement
structural measures to stabilized the dumpsite and pro-
vide scavengers with alternative sustainable livelihoods.
The amount of waste dumped in Leuwigajah actually
sharply increased over the years before the disaster.
Only after the 2005 disaster did the activity of the
dumpsite come to an end, and the local official in charge
of the site was charged for not respecting the official
recommendations regarding waste disposal and was sen-
tenced to jail. In parallel, local communities complained
about the closure of the dumpsite without appropriate
alternative sustainable livelihoods. Although the disasterobviously brought some significant changes in Leuwiga-
jah in the short term, the long-term prospects are bleak.
A project by Environmental Protection Agency of West
Java Province (BPLHD) has been planned for redevelop-
ing a controlled landfill on the same site.
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